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ABSTRACT 
When the dust settles on 2000 and the financial markets look back over the year, 
one company will be seen to have dominated the headlines: Pacific Century 
CyberWorks (PCCW). The corporation outmaneuvered state-controlled Singapore 
Telecom and media magnate Rupert Murdoch in a brief but epic battle to acquire 
Cable & Wireless HKT (HKT). Through bank loans and share placement, Richard Li 
Tzar-kai (the second son of Hong Kong Tycoon Li Ka-shing) finally succeeded in 
mustering as much as $38.1 billion in a buyout of Hong Kong's oldest 
telecommunications company (among the HSI-constituent blue chips). 
PCCW was simply a company investing in a diversity of technologically oriented 
firms including incubators, research centers, laboratories, and Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs). More important, it was living on a set of concepts, which gave the 
corporation an aspiring image and a main source of its ballooning market 
capitalization. Indeed, the Age of the Internet, or the Digital Era, makes everything 
possible. Any corporation, even the most established, can be a target of a hot Internet 
start-up. Not long ago, Internet service provider American Online merged with media 
behemoth Time Warner in a $165-billion deal — with the web firm as the senior 
partner. It followed that a lot of brick-and-mortar companies were beginning to 
realize that it was possible for an upstart like PCCW to do a lot more than most 
people had thought it could have done. In fact, what was a trend then is that the 
market was giving these start-ups a lot of capital to go out and be a threat to existing 
companies. For a company like PCCW to do what it did in 10 months 一 that has really 
shaken up corporate Asia. Everyone in old-economy boardrooms wondered how to 
ii 
show shareholders that the current management could extract more value from the 
existing business. 
However, such an Asian mega-merger as PCCW-HKT (as widely known as the 
name of the combined entity) was doomed to failure as it could not deliver what it 
had promised just before the combination. Not only did it fail to create value for its 
combined shareholders, it sent its stock price to historical lows, creating further 
skepticism among investors about its capability to merge the assets of the two 
companies in a two-plus-two-equals-five manner. In fact, the marriage came with 
little complementarity between the assets and practices of the component companies. 
The nature of the services of PCCW being too far ahead or too visionary, it is difficult 
for them to walk their way into the sprawling cable and wireless network and a city-
coverage of users. More important, many of the high-flying services were not ready 
for near-term launch and took long to be commercialized or incorporated into the 
existing distribution channels of HKT. Of course, there is no sparing of a 
comprehensive, systematic diagnosis for uncovering the real reasons for the 
floundering of the joint business. That is exactly what our project comes to serve. 
Our project centers on an analysis of the problems that prevented the pan-Asia 
record-breaking merger of PCCW-HKT from delivering newly created value. The 
analysis goes on an asset-by-asset basis, being guided by a Value Dynamics 
framework proposed and used by Arthur Anderson, the world's Big Five accounting-
cum-consulting firm. 
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Companies that expand via mergers and acquisitions (M&A) achieve their 
business objectives only half of the time. They achieve expected economic synergies 
such as lower manufacturing or distribution costs even less frequently. Investors, 
employees, customers, and communities tend to ignore the mantra: Unless a merger 
produces synergies and other benefits that offset the (mainly bureaucratic) costs 
involved, the acquirer's shareholders will lose. Among the losers will be the 
employees who are displaced, the customers who see prices rise and service quality 
fall, and the communities that must pick up the pieces of shuttered facilities and lost 
jobs. 
The issue is not whether to participate in mergers or acquisitions but how to 
improve the likelihood of achieving success. For a merger to make economic sense, it 
must clear a high hurdle. The (risk-adjusted) net present value of the combination's 
economic benefits must exceed the premium paid plus other transaction expenses, 
which include severance, closure of facilities, and assets consolidations as well as 
fees paid to investment bankers, attorneys, and other advisers. Certainly, there are 
also elusive costs to deal with, one of the main kinds being bureaucratic costs in the 
form of, say, resistance due to cultural and management-style differences. 
Given those challenges, managing risk is admittedly among best approaches 
to generate success for corporate combinations. Indeed, risks are present at every 
stage of the M&A life cycle, composed of pre-deal investigation, due diligence, 
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merger integration, and implementation. Even when the acquirer believes that it has 
done in-depth homework to justify or vindicate the rationale for a deal, unexpected 
problems may invariably plague the combination. 
As the 21 St Century moves forward, however, mergers and acquisitions may 
cut across the dissolving line between the Old Economy and New Economy camps 
into which rapid technological advance has sundered. M&A-related risk becomes 
more diverse and more difficult to define and manage. More, an increasing portion of 
risk rests with ex-balance-sheet assets, especially intangible ones. In this way, 
essential is a whole new view of a combined company's assets that can create value if 
appropriately linked to each other, which provides an appropriate (to the New 
Economy) way of managing risk through value creation. Arthur Anderson, among the 
world's five largest accounting-cum-consulting firms, has worked in this direction 
and its three-year intensive effort has borne fruit in some sense — a Value Dynamics 
framework for exploring value-creating opportunities and possibilities lurking in the 
(inner, outer, existing, and emerging) relationships of a company, which have eluded 
traditionally minded managers, ones obsessed solely with Old Economy concepts. 
Businesspeople have been increasingly obsessed with expanding through 
corporate combination, which they believe is a short cut to achieving market share 
gains. History, however, do not confirm the conviction entirely. Indeed, only half of 
the M&A deals have been successful, but not all of them created value. Besides, 
value creation is necessarily attained by means of the cooperation of the M&A type. 
Long-term contractual relationships like strategic alliances and joint ventures can 
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serve the value-adding purpose, sometimes more effectively than M&A-typed 
cooperation. Even so, an M&A strategy is still with its glitter and gloss; at least, a 
combined company provides a better mechanism of coordination and sharing 
resources, ideas, and practices to leverage a unified brand across separate markets 
through a common marketing program. 
As the M&A gaze has been sweeping Hong Kong, many businesspeople 
attempted to achieve size through M&A deals, blind to the possible ramifications that 
would upset their expectations, say, of creating value through expanded market share 
and bigger capacity. In fact, failures mounted. This so interests us as to investigate the 
reasons that a merger or acquisition falls apart when it cannot deliver what it has been 
expected to or even plunge itself into straitened circumstances that the constituent 
companies would have avoided while apart. Our project performs a case study of the 
record-breaking M&A deal in Hong Kong - the acquisition of the Hong Kong-based 
subsidiary of Cable & Wireless HKT (abbreviated as HKT) by "Super-kid" Richard 
Lee's Pacific Century CyberWorks (abbreviated as PCCW). The second son of Hong 
Kong Tycoon "Superman" Lee Ka Shing, Richard Lee was expected to unite its New 
Economy-oriented PCCW to the established incumbent HKT, with a basket of 
thriving Old Economy businesses, and benefit from the mutual complementation of 
the assets of both constituents. He rose to towering fame with a surge of the market 
capitalization of his Pacific Century Group's flagship. More legendary is, however, 
that the combination proved a flop as short as a semi-year, with over 90% knocked 
off the peak of its share price. The price slide reflected the company's failure to 
incorporate PCCW's skills and know-how into the processes of HKT and to 
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complement the core assets of both companies to each other. To boot, debt-ridden 
PCCW checked the growth of the combined company by drying up the cash streams 
and selling off core assets to service the debt. This stalled the progress of synergy 
initiatives (if any) as resources, efforts, and attention were all diverted to maximize 
short-term profits for blood-staunching purchases. Although the misfortunes have not 
finished up the merged entity, more of them are in store. This entails a comprehensive 
diagnosis of the company and a plan of remedy to return the company to the path of 
profitability and success. At this rate, our project attempts to fulfill this need. 
Furthermore, such a merger — PCCW-HKT — lends itself, as a most attention-
deserving case of the integration of the Old and New Economy models, to illustrating 
how Value Dynamics provides a better understanding of why the megacombination 
fell short of widespread expectations and what would have made the marriage a 
success. We shall focus our effort on studying the stage of post-merger integration, 
where risk is associated mainly with leadership and communications and 
managerial/management attention is called for to maintaining business community 
and unifying operations, to spot where the cracks lie that are shedding shareholder 
value and examine how to staunch the openings. 
The rest of the project comes in four sections, in addition to the appendixes 
and bibliography. The first section presents a review of the reasons why mergers and 
acquisitions can fail to create value, if not flounder outright. Besides, it gives an 
analytical framework, (Arthur Anderson's) Value Dynamics, within with which our 
diagnosis of PCCW-HKT will operate. Second come the pre-deal backgrounds of the 
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two partners, PCCW and HKT. Next, a diagnosis of the corporate combination will 
be performed to detect the mistakes that led to a loss of value and provide a preface to 
the suggested ways to prevent the failings and yield results of value creation�Our 
project concludes with a host of recommendations that the combined company would 
have done to shun shedding the blood that carries shareholder value in itself. In fact, 
the spin-offs, including even those of its core assets, have prepared the stage on which 
only a doomed role can be played. The recommendations we shall set forth will be 




This section tries to develop a review of both the historical reasons for the 
failure of a merger, acquisition, or internal integration to achieve value creation and a 
Value Dynamics framework, which provides a context for our analysis of the 
problems with the assets that most likely undermine the extent of the interplay 
between the assets, or their complementation to each other, which is key to increased 
shareholder value. 
(I) Review Of The Justifications For A Merged Entity Failing To Create 
Value 
Understanding the past cases of the post-merger failure to combine their 
strengths for the sake of increased value can help to deal with similar incidents in 
future. With a review of the problems for achieving value creation, corporate 
executives will be more likely to take a balanced, skeptical view of possible synergies 
or other value-creating possibilities, and will less likely seek for acquisition targets 
thoughtlessly or jump to apparently profitable merger opportunities. Hopefully, the 
review will provide a lesson so the initiators or dealmakers can counter the natural 
allure of value creation by subjecting their instincts to rigorous evaluation. The 
reasons discussed as below can be applied to both mergers and acquisitions, and even 
cases of internal integration when a firm expands on its own. 
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The host of potential problems that will appear below are mainly strategic and 
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attributable to the merging firms' lack of strengths and capabilities that can enable the 
merged entity to create value. When strategic problems exist, the company cannot 
rectify them as easily as when it would weed out operational ones. Such problems 
include targeting a wrong partner in an M&A deal so there are no possibilities of 
working together in a way that value can be created. Besides, a company may pursue 
too aggressive an M&A strategy and thus stretch its resources too thinly to manage 
the bigger self effectively. More important, such strategic problems act as roadblocks 
to the dynamic use of the different assets that transcend the formerly dividing line of 
the company to capitalize on the potential complementality of such assets to produce 
extra value that previously eluded the component companies. Therefore, taking a 
review of such problems will help dealmakers to prevent them while in a target-
choosing process. 
(i) Integration Difficulties 
Integrating two companies following an acquisition can be quite difficult. 
Integration issues include those of melding two disparate corporate cultures, linking 
different financial and control systems, building effective working relationships 
(particularly when management styles differ), and resolving problems regarding the 
status of the newly acquired firm's executives. The importance of a successful 
integration should not be underestimated; whether a firm can ultimately benefit from 
financial diversification depends on such a success. Firms often encounter difficulties 
in the range of activities associated with integration. Such activities include: 
Ensuring satisfaction with product quality and customer service; 
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Meeting with key community leaders to chart social strategy and build trust in 
the new company's leadership team; 
•:• Rapidly executing the integration plan, including contingency measures, to 
minimize negative financial effects that could compromise the transaction's 
economic model; 
Communicating openly and frequently with employees at all levels and 
sustaining reasonable productivity; 
Tracking the loss of top talent and responding quickly and forcefully to the 
poaching of workers by competitors; 
Respecting commitments to suppliers, distributors, and alliance partners, 
keeping them informed, and sharing the benefits of synergies with them, as 
appropriate. 
(ii) Inadequate Evaluation of The Target 
Due-diligence is a process through which a firm evaluates a target firm for 
acquisition. An effective due-diligence process examines hundreds of items in areas 
as diverse as those of financing the intended transaction, differences in cultures 
between the acquiring and target firms, tax consequences of the transaction, and 
actions that would be necessary to successfully meld the two workforces. The failure 
to complete an effective due-diligence process often results in the acquirer paying a 
premium — sometimes an excessive one 一 for the target. Indeed, research shows that, 
without due-diligence, the purchase price is driven by the pricing of other comparable 
acquisitions rather than by a rigorous assessment of where, when, and how 
management can drive real performance gains. In these cases, the price paid may 
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have little to do with the achievable value. Also, premiums paid without effective due 
diligence may account for research results indicating that the amount of the purchase 
premium does predict acquisition success. 
(iii) Large Or Extraordinary Debt 
To finance a number of acquisitions completed during the past two decades, 
some companies significantly increased their levels of debt. Partly making it possible 
was a financial innovation called junk bonds, a financing option that risky 
acquisitions are financed with money that provides a large potential return to lenders. 
As junk bonds are unsecured obligations, which are not tied to specific assets pledged 
as collateral, interest rates for these high-risk debt instruments can reach 20 percent — 
a reason that plunged many merged entities into negative territories of profitability. 
Also supporting a decision to increase debt significantly in order to acquire 
other companies was the belief that "debt disciplined managers, causing them to act 
in shareholders' best interests". This view was grounded in work completed by 
finance scholars who argued that the constraints on spending possibilities created by 
the requirement to service debt obligations caused managers to be more prudent in 
allocating remaining funds and to behave less opportunistically. This logic resulted in 
managers sometimes being encouraged (by their firm's board of directors or finance 
officials) to utilize significant leverage to finance large acquisitions. 
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(iv) Managerial Biases 
Four types of biases explain the difficulty or infeasibility of achieving value 
creation. First comes synergy bias. Synergy means working together. Mangers suffer 
from a presumption that creating value must be through collaboration between 
departments, business units, teams, and so on. However, there can be the absence of 
conditions that such units can provide�Different subsidiaries may face differences in 
local conditions in the geographical markets they are operating in. Consumers in 
different territories differ in taste and preference. In the event, a corporate or 
headquarters-led marketing campaign may not serve the different markets equally 
well and may do harm to some of them, say, by going against the local custom. 
The second sort is parenting bias. Executives are so jaundiced that they believe 
corporate intervention is a precondition for value creation. For that matter, therefore, 
they are always pushing inter-unit cooperation and turn a deaf ear to the explanation 
of the unit managers for the difficulty of such collaboration. Such a misplaced belief 
causes them to attribute the unit managers' resistance to their "not-invented-here" 
syndrome, which further confirms the necessity of a forceful policy to make 
mandatory cooperation. In fact, such central intervention should be blamed for inter-
unit friction that undermine the organizational unity and dent the existing value. 
Third comes skill bias. Many times, there is an illusion that executives are with 
appropriate integration skills to produce additional value. It led them to enforce inter-
unit collaboration and believe that they can see it through and act on the problems if 
they arise. When they later wake up to the dearth of such skills to ensure smooth 
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cooperation, the efforts to combine processes will serve to be a waste and have 
shattered the originally separate processes that might be running quite efficiently. 
Final is upside bias. Dealmakers tend to be blind to the downsides to a 
prospective corporate combination. They are dazzled only by the anticipated success 
of a deal and figure out how far the deal will achieve in terms of value created. 
Neglecting to balance the upsides against the downsides of the possible combination 
will produce a risk that a floundering merged entity will ensue. Management will find 
themselves busy only with resolving the downsides once the downsides surface. 
(v) Excessive Diversification 
Used properly, diversification strategies lead to strategic competitiveness and 
above-average returns. At some point, however, firms can become overdiversified. 
The level at which this happens varies across companies. The reason for the variation 
is that each firm has different capabilities that are required to successfully manage 
diversification. Related diversification requires more information processing than does 
unrelated diversification. The need for related diversified firms to be able to process 
more, and more diverse, information creates a situation where they become 
overdiversified with a smaller number of business units, compared to firms using an 
unrelated diversification strategy. Regardless of the type of diversification strategy 
implemented, though, declines in performance usually result from excessive 
diversification. 
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Even when a firm is not overdiversified, a high level of diversification can 
have a negative effect on the firm's long-term performance. The scope created by 
additional amounts of diversification often causes executives to rely on financial 
rather strategic controls to monitor and evaluate business units' performance. 
Employment of financial controls to judge managerial performance can lead 
individual business-unit managers to focus on short-term outcomes at the expense of 
long-term investments that will help to enhance the firm's overall strategic 
competitiveness. 
(vi) Bluefish Phenomenon 
In their pursuit of an M&A strategy, executives or managers can be driven by 
a bluefish feeding frenzy - when a school of blues comes across a school of herring or 
similar small fish, the blues go wild, charging every which way in an effort to gorge 
themselves. In business, when capital is extensively available and companies are busy 
with making deals, some executives start behaving like bluefish. Making deals is 
exciting; making one's company bigger may be even more thrilling. Further, the 
prospect of solving the problem of competing in a difficult industry by buying a 
competitor or diversifying into a related field can seem very appealing - a simple way 
out of an apparently hopeless industry situation. When the investment banker calls 
with a prospect, the executive bites. Having eaten once and enjoyed it, the same 
executive will bite again, oftentimes ignoring the quality of thinking, preparation, and 
post-merger integration and management. 
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(vii) Too Large A Resultant Firm 
The increased size following a merger or acquisition can help a firm to gain 
economies of scale that in turn lead to more efficient operations. However, at some 
level, the additional costs required to manager the larger firm exceed the benefit of 
improved efficiency. In addition, faced with the complexities generated by the larger 
size, new management typically decide that more bureaucratic controls be used to 
manage the combined firm's operations. Bureaucratic controls are formalized 
supervisory and behavioral rules and policies that are designed to ensure consistency 
of decisions and actions across different units of a firm. Such consistency can benefit 
the firm, primarily in the form of predictability and cost reductions. However, across 
time, relatively rigid and standardized managerial behavior tends to be the product of 
strict adherence to formalized rules and policies. Certainly, in the long run, the 
diminished degree of flexibility that accompanies such behavioral rigidity and 
standardization will impair the firm's ability to innovate. 
(II) Analytical Framework 
Consolidations and convergence are global megatrends in the 
telecommunications industry. The past decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in 
the pace and size of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the industry. In 2000, the 
value of telecommunications M&A activity worldwide hit a stratospheric high of 
billions of dollars and, despite a downturn in the several past quarters, it is expected 
that M&A activity will continue at a rapid race due mainly to the United States's 
slowdown creating a less favorable environment where cash-strapped, less efficient 
players will find themselves further vulnerable to takeovers and the pressure to 
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present a unified front in face of the pressed development of third-generation (3G) 
wireless systems. 
Yet the industry is well aware that many corporate combinations have failed to 
achieve their objectives. For example, not surprisingly, even before officially 
completed, the stunning $129 billion merger of WorldCom and Sprint — the largest 
M&A deal in American history — is about to flop for other reasons than purely 
regulatory obstacles. Indeed, the urge to merge or combine is driven by a desire to 
increase the value of an organization — through, say, expanding the customer base, 
product range, or brand. However, while companies focus on enhancing these aspects 
of their business when looking for a corporate combination partner, they tend to 
ignore other value drivers in the business that will support the long-term growth of 
their customer base, their product range, their brand — and their share price. Without 
considering these factors, the potential value of combinations, rather than being 
unleashed, is unrealised. 
Competing successfully as a global institution in today's market depends on 
having the ability to meet client needs globally and achieve larger scale, in terms of 
geographical reach, customer segments, or range of products and/or services. Apart 
from mergers, there has been an increase in other forms of corporate combinations, 
such as strategic alliances and joint ventures, which can enable companies to achieve 
similar scale. But is this relentless trend in the industry a value-adding strategy or 
simply a defensive measure? 
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(i) Enter The Value Dynamics Framework 
Traditional theories or propositions defining post-merger shareholder value 
and providing approaches to increased value in an old sense, like those regarding post-
merger coinsurance benefits and Gordon's valuation models, have gradually given 
way while the world is being engulfed in a New-Economy way of running a business, 
which has made geographical barriers irrelevant and amplified network externalities 
through the adoption of information technology-based business solutions, which make 
business processes much more efficient. Such new benefits originate from assets 
beyond traditional categories that are absent in a balance sheet while they are made 
dynamic use of. Such new assets, and how to use them, should receive proper 
attention since, today, a significant part of the globe's economic output is intangible 
and that part is growing at exponential rates. Such rapidly expanding intangibility, as 
in relationships, knowledge, brands, and systems, can be said to define, or take center 
stage in, the New Economy. In recognition of Internet-enabled information revolution, 
and looking at value accordingly, the intensive three-year, 10000-firm research done 
by professionals, led by Richard E.S. Boulton, Barry D. Libert, and Steve M. Samek, 
at Arthur Anderson has drawn on the Value Dynamics framework, defined more 
broadly as the drivers of value for a business. The framework brings together all the 
assets and attributes that drive value and wealth creation as they are properly used in a 
dynamic or inter-complementary fashion. It enables managers to see the enterprise as 
a whole and to gain a greater understanding of how all assets contribute to value 
creation. 
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Value Dynamics recognizes five categories of assets: financial, physical, 
customers, employees & suppliers, and organizational. It expands the existing 
framework to include both tangible and intangible, along with sources of value inside 
the organization and external to it. The ideas underlying the Value Dynamics 
framework are straightforward (see figure 1). For example, assets must: 
•:• Be tangible and intangible; 
•:• Be defined more broadly as sources of future value; 
•:• Be owned and not owned, controlled and not controlled; 
•:• Produce outputs in each value dynamic category; 
•:• Have distinct life cycles; 
Be managed to create, rather than destroy, value; 
Include internal and external sources of value. (An in-depth discussion of the 
Value Dynamics framework will be given later in this section.) 
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Leadership Innovation Ny 
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Financial Employe 
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Debt \ / Employees 
Investment \ / Suppliers 
Equity Partners 
* Intellectual Property 
Source: Cracking The Value Code’ c2000, p. 30. 
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It is important for companies to understand and identify the most important 
sources of value from tangible and intangible assets so they are given the right degree 
of management focus in strategic and operational activity. It is doubtless that the mix 
and interaction of assets in which a company invests - tangible and intangible — are 
among the most critical drivers of value creation. 
As the market's understanding of what contributes to success in corporate 
combinations to success in corporate combinations grows sophisticated, it will look at 
precisely this broader range of factors when it assesses how well, or otherwise, such 
combinations are performing. When incorporating these factors into its strategy and 
selecting the right value-creating partners, management must educate and 
communicate to the market how these factors, when integrated with traditional 
financial measures (e.g. those on balance sheets), provide the optimum way to assess 
how a combination is performing. It will then provide fast and effective evidence that 
the valuation is warranted. 
(ii) Internal Drivers Should Be There 
While some firms chose organic growth as the ideal model to enhance their 
value, this sort of growth has not been and is unlikely to become a reality for those 
companies striving to remain competitive in a growing field of global giants. Some 
institutions see corporate combinations as a defensive instead of a proactive strategy, a 
reaction to external market and, in some regions, regulatory pressures rather than an 
activity internally motivated or directed. 
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Defensive mergers have a place in the uncertain market arena and can be 
positive if they are positively managed. Viewed defensively, though, corporate 
combinations can lead the initiator or dealmaker to overestimate the value of its 
potential partner and hence overpay for their business. Additionally, defense-minded 
initiators are forced into timing or schedules they would not have chosen. Timing is a 
key contingency factor that managers cannot afford to ignore or take lightly so they 
can protect the value of institutions, but no one deal is likely to meet all the strategic 
goals of any organization. The challenge is to choose the right kind of combination, 
with the right partner at the right time. This is the dynamic that helps to create value. 
The herd instinct — to enter into a corporate combination because a competitor 
has done so — can have drawbacks akin to other defensive mergers. This includes a 
much lower probability of securing a strategic partner that fits and will therefore 
ensure value, and the probability that the management of many companies will make 
the mistake of thinking size is all that matters. While being big is good, being big and 
good is likely to secure more value for the institution. 
As Arthur Anderson revealed, of the corporations that selected customer- and 
product-related assets as most important, not all (only 37/52) sought to improve this 
area of their operations. The consulting firm revealed in 1999 that 44 percent of all 
large mergers completed between 1994 and 1997 fell short of financial and strategic 
expectations that additional value could be achieved. Besides, the results reported in 
1999 by KPMG International indicate massive failures: 83 percent of the 700 most 
expensive deals from 1996 to 1998 failed to boost shareholder wealth and 53 percent 
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reduced the wealth. In fact, the inertia is chiefly (of course, political and bureaucratic 
resistance counts too) because these companies suffered also from the weaknesses in 
their own employee and physical assets, in which case the customer- and product-
related assets (even though they were enhanced by marrying others with such 
strengths) contributed merely little as drivers of corporate combinations. In order 
words, these institutions were potentially without the resources to serve the enhanced 
customer base they were seeking. Without this type of internal support to ensure that 
the enlarged clientele or product range is integrated into the new entity, an 
organization risks losing value in the combination. It follows that a poorly thought-out 
deal helps to achieve little. 
(iii) Value Dynamics Shift Attention To A Broader Range Of Value Measures 
Management must give attention to a broader range of value measures that 
support long-term share growth. Understanding the value of drivers in the business 
will enable management to meet share price performance demands by the marketplace 
in the short term while ensuring that the groundwork is laid out for the longer-term 
success of the business. 
Short-term share price performance will always be an important measure; it 
should not be the only focus of value by management. The market can and does now 
look at a more diverse range of shareholder value measures, including such items as 
customer and employee retention and market share, among others. Management can 
uphold and profit from this growing appreciation of broader value measures by 
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communicating with the market on how it is measuring value. These broader measures 
are not separate from the share price, but are vital to its support. 
This broader perspective on value in the business will achieve not only short-
term growth in share price, but also longer-term and more sustainable share price 
performance. Besides, the very perspective will give management the ability to focus 
on those aspects of their business that generate true value in terms of share price and 
therefore deserve the highest level of management attention. Given the importance of 
a broader view of value-creating possibilities, throughout the rest of our project, the 
concepts underlying the Value Dynamics framework will consistently be applied and 
called on to buttress and validate our arguments. 
(iv) A Further Look At The Value Dynamics Framework 
The Value Dynamics framework helps to classify appropriately the assets of 
our time. With it, managers are able to better identify and leverage all of the assets 
essential to success in the New Economy — intangible as well as tangible. Also, it 
supports managers in their effort to capture more of the value within their 
organization - value that now lies untapped and unrecorded. 
The framework includes not only traditional categories of physical and 
financial assets — so-called balance-sheet assets, but also three new groupings: 
employee and supplier assets, customer assets, and organizational assets. These new 
categories mainly comprise intangible assets, which have until now primarily been 
accounted for as expenses or providing revenues in the financial reporting system. 
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Moreover, the framework distinguishes between inbound and outbound relationship 
assets. Customers and market alliances are outbound from the company to the 
marketplace. The company's inbound relationships include employees and suppliers — 
the people and organizations that provide materials, products, and services. 
Companies create value by making the most of these tangible and intangible 
assets, different combinations of which form an organization's "economic DNA". By 
encompassing the full range of assets, Value Dynamics represents a major first step 
toward cracking the value code and seeing the organization as a whole. The Value 
Dynamics framework thus offers a context for viewing the ways that organizations 
create value by combining and realigning different types of assets, both tangible and 
intangible. More important, Value Dynamics provides a new set of tools to help create 
value in the New Economy and its tenor speaks directly to the four realities of the 
New Economy. 
(v) New Business Models Are Emerging 
Businesses are their assets, all of their assets — tangible ad intangible, owned 
and unowned. But in the New Economy, it is intangible assets such as relationships, 
knowledge, people, brands, and systems that are taking center stage. They are seen in 
the new strategies and business models developed by such powerhouses as Microsoft 
Corporation, E*TRADE Group, Inc., and Amazon.coin, Inc. Successful companies 
will combine both old and New Economy assets. In fact, it is the combination and 
interaction of various assets — more than any one factor — that will determine a 
businesses economic success. 
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(vi) New Business Models Create New Risks 
Companies are increasingly employing unique business models, which push 
the boundaries of traditional controls. In other words, leading-edge companies are 
finding that their management and measurement systems are no longer aligned with 
the assets that they are using to create value. What is more, the New Economy is 
producing a whole set of different risks — from new transactions and new markets to 
new technologies, new competitors, and new relationships. However, risk in the New 
Economy encompasses the upside and the downside. As a result, companies need to 
embrace, and manage, risk so they can be prosperous and successful. 
(vii) New Processes And Tools Are Needed To Succeed 
How a company builds and manages its portfolio of assets ultimately 
determines its success. Nonetheless, despite the growing importance of intangible 
assets in the New Economy, most businesses do not have formal processes and 
systems to manage the assets and the risks they create. While some processes are 
becoming outmoded, others, from brand management to distance learning, are rising 
to importance. Businesses need new processes for setting strategy, operating, 
managing risk, and using information in decision-making. 
(viii) Transparency Of Information Is Vital To Value Creation 
Even as new markets and technologies like the Internet create and distribute 
better information about all the assets that matter, managers need more to support 
value creation. Real-time financial reporting is almost a reality for some companies, 
as are systems integrating internal and external data for delivery to the corporate 
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desktop. Thus, businesses must recognize that the old models of information for 
decision-making - including measurement and reporting — are becoming obsolete. 
Under the models of the past, companies have focused primarily on internal 
information, while resisting disclosing more than the bare minimum required by 
regulation. The model of the future is transparent and user-driven, and allows 
stakeholders to readily access the information they need to know, when they need to 
know it. Companies will need to measure all of their value-creating assets, including 
the difficult-to-measure intangibles. Being approximately right is more important in 
these areas than being precisely wrong. 
Let us go a step further, however, by identifying the most significant assets 
within the five asset classes in Figure 1. Under no means, this list of assets is all-
inclusive. A company makes investments in many different assets within these board 
categories, depending on its unique requirements. Nevertheless, the 25 assets listed in 
the diagram are a good starting point for identifying and classifying the assets that 
matter to the company's ability to create value. 
Just about important is the set of ideas underlying the Value Dynamics 
framework. 
Assets are tangible and intangible. The framework expands the definition of 
assets to include both tangible and intangible sources of value. By doing so, it 
encourages a new view of each asset's value proposition: People are no longer just 
expenses. Customers are more than sources of current or even future revenues. 
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Balance-sheet assets like factories and financial capital are not the only assets that 
matter. 
Assets are defined more broadly as sources of future value. The word of 
asset is no longer used in the manner prescribed by prevailing accounting rules. 
Instead, Value Dynamics defines assets as all potential sources of future economic 
benefit that have the capacity to contribute to a company's overall value. The 
definition thus expands the perspective on value creation. 
Assets are both owned and un-ownedy controlled and not. Conventional 
accounting definitions of assets are based on concepts of control and exclusivity. 
Value Dynamics holds that assets encompass sources of value both within a 
company's control and beyond it. Sources of values may include not only a 
company's controlled assets, such as its customer-focused Web site, but also customer 
and partner assets that the company neither owns nor controls. 
Assets in each category produce outputs. The Value Dynamics framework 
offers a guide for mapping the outputs produced by assets in all the five asset classes. 
Physical assets provide productive capacity whereas financial assets bring with 
themselves various forms of capital and information, while customer assets supply 
information and money and employee and supplier assets offering products and 
services, skills, and knowledge, with organizational assets provide a range of outputs 
from patented know-how to codified processes and systems. 
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Assets have distinct life cycles. Each asset has its own unique cost of 
acquisition, management, renewal, and disposition. Assets have economic lives with a 
beginning and an end. The framework serves as a context for creating a risk and 
reward profile for each asset and for the portfolio overall. It encourages and supports a 
focus on managing the life cycle of all assets. 
Assets must be managed to create，rather than destroy，value. Assets have 
two faces. In a time of rapid change, they can quickly deteriorate, decreasing a 
company's market value. Alternatively, some assets may be extraordinary value-
creators. Employees, for example, may use their skills to create value, but they many 
destroy their company's value if they are poorly motivated or have outdated skills. 
Likewise, a department store maintained long past its economic prime will be 
recorded on the balance sheet as an asset, when in reality it may be eroding the 
retailer's value. 
Assets include internal and external sources of value. Companies use both 
internal and external assets in their business models. These include inbound assets 
such as supply chain partners and raw materials, and all things outbound or in the 
marketplace, such as customers, channels, and brands. Indeed, it is necessary to 
redefine the asset base of a company to include many relationships external to the 
company itself. 
Understanding the seven ideas underscoring Value Dynamics helps to create a 
common language of value used to discuss both traditional and New Economy assets 
26 
across corporate functions and skill sets. Such a commonality will enable people in 
various departments, as well as people in different disciplines, to exchange know-how 
that creates value. Chapter IV will incorporate such concepts to produce a properly 
grounded analysis of PCCW-HKT, which explores the possibilities that value can be 




In the following sub-sections is given an overview of Pacific Century 
CyberWorks and Cable & Wireless HKT, the two companies that combine to be the 
monolith PCCW-HKT, which claimed to transcend the Old and New Economies. 
Knowledge of the companies' backgrounds prior to their merger is required before a 
diagnosis of the merged entity can be performed. 
(I) Pacific Century CyberWorks Limited 
(i) Nature of Business 
PCCW is involved primarily in technology businesses related to the Internet 
and the delivery of broadband ISP-enabling services and technologies to local access 
operators through an innovative system of satellite-to-broadband ground distribution. 
With a mission to become the world's leading provider of broadband interactive 
services, the company's business strategy is to establish an interactive broadband 
platform for offering and enabling a wide variety of consumer and enterprise services 
through the Internet and television. 
(ii) Core Businesses 
PCCW has five core businesses that include its flagship “ Network of the 
World “ (NOW), business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce, CyberWorks Ventures 
(CWV), property developments including the Cyberport, and systems integration 
activities. 
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(a) Network of the World (NOW) 
NOW is claimed by PCCW as the world's first converged Internet and digital 
video content service, combining the unique capabilities of television, personal 
computer and the World Wide Web. NOW integrates TV program with synchronized 
multimedia content available on the Internet. User can view linear content and 
simultaneously tap the resources of the Internet to drill down for more detailed 
information or interact at any number of levels. NOW aims to provide this hybrid 
Internet access and interactive TV services to millions of subscribers in the Asia 
Pacific region via satellite to cable TV operators in such places. NOW's programs and 
contents are produced in the company's London studio and production center. 
NOW services rollout began in June 2000 where India is the first place of 
debut In Hong Kong, NOW has broadcast through i-Cable's cable TV channel with 
only English-language content on celebrity trivia and music videos. However, due to 
low viewership, the service lasted only for three months. Other countries such as 
China, Japan and Australia, PCCW is still paving the way for broadcasting in these 
markets. By far NOW has derived some minor revenue from advertising. The 
company expects NOW to generate decent subscription incomes and commissions 
from e-commerce transactions. However, it seems that NOW needs much better 
content than the current games, crude British pop-music shows and English-language 
sports program that have so far failed to attract advertisers and e-commerce 
opportunities. 
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(b) B2B e-commerce 
PCCW provides B2B e-commerce services to the small, medium, and large-
sized enterprise community. It has formed a joint venture company with Hong Kong-
based NetCel Limit to provide comprehensive B2B e-commerce services and acquire 
and develop a network of B2B e-commerce companies. The company expects B2B e-
commerce to be an important long-term source of revenue for its broadband business. 
(c) CyberWorks Ventures (CWV) 
CWV is the investment arm of PCCW that takes strategic positions in, 
incubates and operates a portfolio of Internet technology companies. Its investment 
strategies include: to aggregate invested companies' technologies to provide a one-
stop-shop for businesses that plan to migrate onto the Web; and to build the largest 
most diverse network of Internet companies in Asia. CWV invests across all the 
technology and infrastructure layers of the New Economy and targets companies that 
can provide PCCW's NOW and its partners with cutting-edge infrastructure services, 
content, e-commerce solutions, and connectivity. 
CWV has invested in more than 43 companies since PCCW's inception. Its 
investment portfolio is composed of a 47.2% in an investment in the Nasdaq-listed 
CMGI, which is a venture capital fund investing in internet related companies, 17.4% 
in internet and broadband connectivity, and 35.4% in e-commerce, content and 
internet infrastructure (see Appendix 1). The total investment amount was US$742 
million (approximately HK$3,736 million) and 80% of these investments are listed. 
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However, after the global meltdown of technology stocks, these investments have 
dropped by about 80% in value. 
(d) Property Developments 
Presently, Cyberport is the major property development project of PCCW. The 
company has entered into an agreement with the Government of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (the Government) to design, develop, construct and 
market the Cyberport. The Cyberport, with a total gross floor area of about 540,000 
square meters, is an information technology infrastructure development project that is 
divided into two portions: commercial and residential. The commercial portion owned 
by the Government will be composed of office buildings and recreational facilities, 
which is scheduled to complete in stages during 2002 - 2003. The residential portion, 
to be completed in phases during 2004 - 2007, is for sales with proceeds to be shared 
by the company and the Government. PCCW has agreed with the Government that the 
construction costs will be fixed at a maximum of HK$15.8 billion and any cost 
overrun will be borne by the company. 
Aside from the Cyberport project, the company is also engaged in the 
development of and investment in commercial and residential real estate projects in 
China and Hong Kong. However, at the moment, these activities have generated 
insignificant rental income for the company. 
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(e) Systems Intelation Activities 
The company is engaged in the customer premises equipment business in 
Hong Kong, acting principally as a systems integrator for office telecommunications 
systems. The sales of customer premises equipment and provision of related 
maintenance services is the major source of income for PCCW, which has accounted 
for 85% of the company's turnover from continuing operations in 1999. 
(iii) Strategic Alliances 
In October 2000, PCCW has formed a strategic alliance with the government-
controlled Telstra Corporation Limited (Telstra), which is the Australia's leading 
telecommunications and information services company. Telstra is engaged providing 
a full range of telecommunication services including telephone lines, international 
calls, mobile communication, data and Internet services, and pay television services. 
The alliance comprises four forms of cooperation between both companies: 
a merger of certain of the businesses and assets of both companies to create a 
50:50 joint venture to operate a global Internet Protocol Backbone business (IP 
Backbone Company). This IP Backbone Company will be a global carrier of 
voice and data services focused on the Asia-Pacific region; 
a formation of a 50:50 joint venture to establish an internet data center to 
provide data center services to corporate customers in the Asia Pacific region; 
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a formation of a regional wireless company to operate as an Asia-Pacific 
provider of wireless voice and data services. In fact, it is a sale of 60% stake in 
HKT's mobile communication business to Telstra by PCCW. In return, PCCW 
has received a huge cash consideration of US$1,680 million (approximately 
HK$13,100 million); 
a commercial arrangement to distribute NOW's internet service in Australia 
via a hyperlink to the NOW portal on Telstra.com and to deliver NOW's 
content via Telstra's cable lines and satellite high-speed Internet services. 
In addition, PCCW has also received a cash consideration of US$750 million 
(approximately HK$5,850 million) by the issue of a six-year term convertible note to 
Telstra. 
Apart from the strategic alliance with Telstra, the company has also entered 
into an alliance with Intel to enable the deployment of broadband Internet in the Asia 
Pacific region. Intel has acquired a 8% stake in PCCW and has agreed to supply 
comprehensive set-top and server-based solutions, using Intel architecture, to help 
PCCW deliver broadband interactive services. Moreover, the company has entered 
into a wide-ranging agreement with Legend Holdings Ltd., China's largest 
manufacturer and distributor of PCs. The aim of this alliance is to manufacture a co-
branded Legend-NOW PCs with built-in cable modems giving exclusive broadband 
Internet access to the NOW services. 
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(II) Cable & Wireless HKT 
(i) Nature of Businesses 
Cable & Wireless HKT is a subsidiary of the London-based Cable & Wireless 
PLC, which is an international provider of integrated telecommunication services to 
customers in 70 countries. HKT has been operating in Hong Kong for more than 125 
years providing a variety of telecommunication services which includes local and 
international voice, fax and data services, value-added services, satellite services, 
telecommunications equipment and network services, internet access and interactive 
home entertainment. 
(ii) Core Businesses 
HKT ’s businesses can be classified into five categories that include 
international telecommunication, local telecommunication, mobile services, Internet 
and interactive multimedia services (IMS), and broadband services. 
(a) International Telecommunication 
This category includes international telephone services (IDD) and data 
services as well as international network services. The IDD service is offered to both 
business and residential customers. It represents about 40% of HKT's total revenue. 
Due to the Government's introduction of competition for international 
telecommunication services, the company has lost its dominant position in the IDD 
market. Besides, the surrender of exclusive international license and the intense price 
competitions have driven down the company's income from IDD service. 
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In the corporate market, the company has close integration with the Cable & 
Wireless Group to provide end-to-end managed network services to multinational 
corporate customers, utilizing the extensive Cable & Wireless Global Network. Over 
the past five years HKT itself has invested more than HK$2,750 million in its 
international network infrastructure. The company is now serving more than 500 
multinational companies operating in Asia to meet their communication hubbing 
needs. Furthermore, the company provides international leased circuit to support 
corporate customers' demand for Internet and data services. 
(b) Local Telecommunication 
This category includes local telephone services and data and network services. 
Despite the introduction of rivals, HKT, with the ownership of sprawling cable and 
wireless infrastructures, still maintains a dominant position in the saturated local 
telephone market. 
Regarding data and network services, HKT offer local and wide area network 
solutions to small and medium-sized enterprises to provide flexible internal and 
external communication and efficient data sharing. The company also provides sector 
specific solutions for the corporate market, including the Business Recovery Service 
to banking and finance sector, total communications packages for hotel guests and 
electronic data exchange-based services to help streamline operations for the trading 
and manufacturing sector. To meet the increasing demand for data and network 
services, the company has made substantial investments in digital fiber-optic network. 
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(c) Mobile Services 
The Mobile communication is a growth market with the penetration rate 
reached 48% of the population in Hong Kong, the highest of any country. HKT's 
mobile customer base has grown to 950,000 customers. However, due intense price 
competition, the revenue growth from mobile services has been under enormous 
pressure. 
(d) Internet and Interactive Multimedia Services (IMS) 
This category includes Internet network services and customer access services. 
HKT provides wholesale network services to other Internet service providers in HK 
and around the Asia region for local traffic consolidation and international connection. 
For customer access, NETVIGATOR, a business unit of HKT, is the Hong Kong 
market leader providing internet access service to customers with some 311,000 dial-
up customers and 11,000 "always on" broadband customers. Besides, HKT has 
captured approximately 30% of the market for corporate access in Hong Kong. 
Moreover, the company offers a one-stop Internet solution for the business sector, 
including dedicated line access services, website hosting as well as Intranet 
development and e-commerce solutions. 
(e) Broadband Services 
HKT has invested in the world's largest ATM broadband network with 
extended coverage of 75% of Hong Kong's households and the major business areas. 
Through the broadband network, HKT launched its interactive television services 
(iTV) in March 1998. iTV provided a range of on-demand services including videos, 
36 
music, news and home banking, etc. However, since the Hong Kong market is not yet 
ready for this on-demand entertainment service and there are many substitutions, iTV 
were forced to discontinue its services earlier this year. 
In spite of the failure of iTV, HKT has a grand broadband strategy to develop 
the broadband network as a platform for the launch of new high-speed multimedia and 
secure e-commerce applications. It has formed a strategic co-operation with Microsoft 
to develop a range of multimedia applications to be delivered to personal computers 
and TV via HKT丨s broadband network utilizing Microsoft software. It is now 
conducting internal trials. 
(iii) Regional Expansion of Businesses 
HKT has formed management partnerships with the provincial 
telecommunications authorities in China to meet its customers' need of 
communication service in China. In addition, through its associated company in 
Singapore HKT is providing mobile communication services to the Singapore market. 
Furthermore, HKT has gained a foothold in Taiwan's telecommunication market 
through the acquisition of stakes in a local Internet service provider and the Taiwan 




(I) Value Dynamics Framework Analysis 
As described in Chapter II the Value Dynamics framework states that there are 
five categories of assets that are drivers of value for a business. Among the five 
categories of assets, organization assets are the core assets. It is like human brain, 
which organizes and integrates the other four categories of assets to create values. 
Organizational assets, one of the Value Dynamics categories, are compared to the 
brain, which directs the coordination of the rest of the assets categories, which serve 
the functions of the limbs. Indeed, strategy and leadership steer the development of 
the corporation and provide guidelines as to how to employ physical and financial 
assets and to manage, grow, and develop the customers, suppliers, and employees (for 
short, "people" assets). Culture, structure, systems, and processes can help thread 
through the people assets and weld them into a close unity to expand efficiency and 
generate a two-plus-two-equals-five effect through improved interaction (like more 
cooperation between employees, which reduces paperwork and shorten the time for 
information flows). Brand and goodwill can be leveraged across the other categories 
to strengthen the effects while they are deployed and put to use, e.g. when retained 
earnings (financial assets) and manpower (employee assets) are appropriated for a 
marketing program that targets a particular portion of the existing clientele (customer 
assets), a impressive brand (or excellent brand management) or strong goodwill will 
generally make the program easier. Besides, intellectual property (IP), knowledge, and 
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innovation support can nurture or fuel the growth of the corporation by incessantly 
seeking ways to enhance the application and utilization of the other assets. 
As such, these four categories of assets are linked to each other and affect the value 
that each other can create. With regard to the technology industry where PCCW-HKT 
is operating in, organization assets, financial assets, customer assets, and employee 
and supplier assets are more important than the physical assets for value creation. 
Organizational assets such as good strategy can help a technology company 
manage and use its financial assets in a better way to create addition values. For 
example, the company can take up promising investment opportunities or acquire 
physical assets like infrastructure and equipment that contributes to the company 
growth. 
Customer assets such as distribution channel, if applied effectively, can help a 
technology company to maximize the values of its products and services produced 
from or provided by its physical assets. For example, a teleco can take advantage of its 
distribution channel and then maximize the value of its wireless network to offer other 
services such as Internet access to provide a more comprehensive service. 
Employee and supplier assets are also important for a technology company. A 
good strategy needs employees to execute. The capability of the employees will 
significantly influence whether the company can effectively coordinate and organize 
other categories of assets to create values. Suppliers are also important as the right 
suppliers can influence quality of the company's products or services. If a company 
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has no right supplier to supply the right materials for its products, it would not be able 
to take advantage of its good distribution channel. 
In this section, the Value Dynamics Framework will be used to identify 
whether the merger entity PCCW-HKT possesses the five categories of assets stated 
in that framework and analyse whether these assets have created values for the merged 
entity. As PCCW-HKT is a technology company, some specific assets in each asset 
category may not be so important for value creation. The following is an outline of 
what specific assets this analysis will cover: 
• Physical Assets: equipment and building 
•:• Customer Assets: channel 
Financial Assets: cash, debt, and investment 
•:• Employee and Supplier Assets: employee, supplier, and partner 
Organization Assets: innovation, leadership, and strategy 
(i) Physical Assets 
(a) Equipment 
The broadband network and satellite ground stations owned by HKT are assets 
crucial to the success of PCCW's broadband interactive business and constitute one of 
the major reasons why PCCW acquired HKT. Both the NOW and the B2B e-
commerce, two key businesses of PCCW, must rely on the broadband technology for 
providing services. By acquiring HKT's broadband network with extended coverage 
of 750/0 of Hong Kong's households and the major business areas, PCCW will enjoy a 
competitive advantage on the delivery of its NOW services in the Hong Kong market 
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if NOW will be a promising business in the future. Besides, it also gives PCCW a 
technology infrastructure backing for its development of e-commerce services. In 
addition, PCCW's own satellite ” AsiaSatlll “ and HKT's satellite ground stations are 
complementary assets, which will create values for the merged entity. PCCW can 
transmit the NOW contents from its London production center to Hong Kong through 
the satellite or transmit the NOW contents from Hong Kong to other countries in the 
Asia Pacific region. In other words, PCCW will be able to achieve its grand business 
strategy of providing broadband interactive services to the Asia Pacific region. 
(b) Building 
Apart from these, the Cyberport and HKT's telecommunication infrastructure 
are also complementary assets, which will create additional values to the merged 
entity. As the Cyberport is to be developed as Asia's Silicon Valley, it must have 
sophisticated telecommunication facilities for those international hi-tech firms, the 
prospective occupants, to communicate with their overseas headquarters. Therefore, 
HKT's international network infrastructure will add values to the Cyberport project, 
which in turn increases the property values of both commercial and residential 
premises inside the Cyberport. On the other hand, the Cyberport project will also 
bring HKT stable and long-term revenue streams from providing a variety of 
communication services such as local and international calls and data and network 
services. However, since the Cyberport is still at the early stage of development, none 
of those additional values can be realized at the moment. This is one of the major 
problems resulting in the plunge in share price of PCCW-HKT after the merger. 
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(ii) Customers Assets 
(a) Channel 
One of the major reasons for merger is to benefit from the economies of scope. 
When two corporations operating in related businesses merge, they can share their 
resources such as manufacturing facilities or distribution channels to create additional 
values. For example, the merger of Citicorp and Travelers in 1998 has provided 
Travelers a new channel to sell its insurance products and financial services through 
Citicorp's retail banking network. Likewise, Citicorp has also benefited as it can offer 
a more comprehensive range of products and services to its retail customers. 
In our case the merger provides PCCW a direct channel to market it NOW's 
service to HKT's huge retail customers. However, PCCW is unable to capitalize on 
this huge customer base. It is because the current market is not yet ready for this mode 
of interactive entertainment service in addition to NOW's unattractive contents. The 
failure of HKT's iTV service is a good example. Even though there is a market for the 
NOW service, there are still many substitutions such as the cable TV, the two TV 
stations, which would make NOW hard to become popular in Hong Kong. In this 
regard, although PCCW does offer a new service to HKT's customers, this service 
does not add any value to the customers. Neither an increase in HKT's customers' 
loyal nor an expansion of the existing customer base could be seen after the merger. 
On the other hand, the merger also provides a channel for PCCW to market its 
e-commerce services to HKT's corporate clients such as banks, hotels, trading and 
manufacturing companies. With the e-commerce, Internet and infrastructure expertise 
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from PCCW's CyberWorks Venture, the merged entity could, theoretically, be able to 
provide more comprehensive services to the corporate clients. However, it remains 
doubtful whether PCCW's disparate e-commerce and Internet investments can 
coordinate to add values given the company has no proven success track record. 
(iii) Financial Assets 
(a) Cash 
HKT's huge cash reserve of HK$10,329 million is a very valuable asset for 
PCCW if it is used productively and meaningfully. It could finance PCCW's 
development of its broadband interactive and e-commerce businesses. Thus, the 
company needs not to seek external financing and would save any corresponding 
finance costs. However, none of PCCW's core business has, by far, generated 
sufficient cash to repay its HK$93,600 million gigantic bridge loan (see Appendix 2). 
It's total revenue (1999: HK$152 million) was insufficient to pay even for 10% of the 
HK$2,215 million loan interest expenses for the year 2000. In this way, PCCW has no 
choice but to use HKT's cash to finance the repayment of the loan principal and 
interest expenses. In this regard, PCCW is unable to leverage on HKT's cash to create 
additional value. 
(b) Debt 
Furthermore, the merger has turned the combined entity into a heavy debt-
laden company. The huge debt burden and interest expenses have deprived PCCW-
HKT from capturing any investment opportunity such as development of 3G and 
wireless application protocol technologies. It also creates constraints for pursuing 
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continuous investment in telecommunication technology and infrastructure. In the 
long run, this definitely will impede PCCW from achieving continuous growth and 
may adversely affect its market position in the future. 
(c) Investment 
Regarding the Cyber Works Venture (CWV), an investment arm of PCCW, it 
fails to add up to one sure thing to add value to the merged entity. It is hard to see how 
this portfolio of Internet-related investments can be welded to help the development of 
PCCW's broadband interactive business or HKT's telecommunication business. By far, 
CWV's investment in Internet-related companies have not generated any cash income, 
rather than unrealized income arising from appreciation of book value, for the merged 
entity. After the global collapse of Internet stocks, CWV no longer appears to be a 
promising financial asset for PCCW-HKT. Its book value has depreciated by about 
80%. A huge provision of HK$ 3,911 was made for the loss in values of CWV's 
investments which turned the merged entity's financial results into losses. Most of the 
investment losses came from its investment in the Internet conglomerate CMGI and 
the cable broadband enabler SoftNet. 
The global burst of Internet bubble and the crash in Nasdaq have hindered 
many of CWV's investments such as SilkRoute and Outblaze from going for initial 
public offer (IPO). That means PCCW-HKT would not be seeing any return in the 
near future. So the unforeseeable payback and the zero-cash income contribution plus 
the devaluation make CWV an unfavorable asset that destroys instead of creates 
values for the merged entity. 
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(iv) Employee And Supplier Assets 
(a) Employees 
The acquisition of HKT gives the senior management of PCCW a challenge. It 
is because they are challenged to manage the telecommunication business and to add 
value to it. On the other hand, they are tested the ability to capitalize HKT's assets to 
prove PCCW's broadband interactive business model a success. However, PCCW 
does not have much of these talents. By looking at PCCW's management team (see 
Appendix 3), it consists mainly dealmakers including investment bankers and legal 
advisors. These people are valuable assets during the merger and fund raising but not 
during the time for building up the business. In the 22-people senior management, 
only 3 of them have work experience related to the telecommunication business. It 
poses a question of how well PCCW's management team understands the 
telecommunication industry and then come up with distinctive visions and advice to 
add value to HKT. 
Regarding PCCW's own businesses only 3 of the 22-people senior 
management have worked in TV broadcasting industry or broadband technology 
research before joining the company. It casts doubt on the ability of PCCW's 
management to turn NOW to a promising business. 
(b) Suppliers 
For NOW content suppliers are very important inbound assets. The major 
weakness of NOW is the lack of the right suppliers to supply appealing contents. That 
is one of the major reasons behind the failure of NOW in Hong Kong. Presently, 
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NOW does not have any supplier to provide those popular contents such as soccer 
tournaments, Hollywood movies, local news or CNN news. What the suppliers 
supplying NOW are the British celebrity trivia and music videos, which do not appeal 
to the Hong Kong audience. 
(c) Partners 
PCCW has formed many partnership with international hi-tech corporations of 
which Telstra, with its sophisticated telecommunication infrastructure, would be able 
to add values to PCCW-HKT. Telstra's cable broadband network, IP virtual private 
networks, international submarine cables and access to international satellite 
infrastructure are very valuable assets which can facilitate PCCW-HKT's regional 
broadcasting of NOW and development of e-commerce services, 3G and WAP 
products. Apparently, this would be a promising partnership. However, it was not 
reflected in the share price of PCCW, which dropped constantly before and after the 
announcement of the Telstra alliance. It is because of the nature of the joint ventures 
businesses with Telstra. The development of global IP backbone, wireless voice and 
data service, and the operation of Internet data centre are all long-term projects. 
Returns won't be seen instantly. Besides, the market needs for these high-tech services 
are insufficient to make the joint ventures a lucrative business. Furthermore, NOW is 
an unproven business model. It may take years for this type of interactive multi-media 
entertainment to establish a global demand and starts to generate profits. Therefore, no 
immediate values will be created in the Telstra alliance. 
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(V) Organizational Assets 
(a) Innovation 
For the technology industry, innovation is key to maintain competitive edge. 
As PCCW-HKT is engaging in telecommunication and Internet-based businesses, 
innovation is an intangible asset that can create values to the company. NOW's 
broadband interactive entertainment service and its multi-platform and multi-channel 
broadcasting are very innovative ideas. However, these innovative ideas are too far 
ahead of the market needs and have exceeded too much of customers' expectation. 
Therefore, NOW is unable to take advantage of HKT's broadband network and 
distribution channel. As a result, no value is created. 
(b) Leadership 
Before the global burst of the Internet bubble, nobody would disagree that 
Richard Li is a visionary leader. Today, it seems more appropriate to say Richard Li is 
an adroit salesman of concepts who has made his name making deals rather than 
operating a company, especially a teleco. Even though it may not be true, the senior 
lieutenants of his lack the skills and knowledge and so are not familiar with the 
working logic of a teleco. Part of the cabinet is legal advisers, their contribution being 
limited to helping the firm parry the possible illicit behavior that will expose the firm 
to legal charges. Winnie Siu Morrison and Mico Chung is playing one of the roles. 
Although Chung is a lawyer turned investment ace, the management and operation of 
a teleco are offlimits to him. In fact, he was exposed only to investment experience 
when he was at China Strategic Holdings Ltd., an investment firm. Francis Yuen may 
make an outstanding personality, but his flair (which earned him "financial wizard") is 
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largely in the financial discipline. Michael Johnson is famous only for his film 
producing-achievements. Alex Arena has an engineering background and so makes a 
fit for handling affairs at the operational level. However, developing corporate 
strategy may well elude him as he was rarely so exposed (though he was among those 
participants in formulating investment strategy for the combined company). Perhaps, 
Hubert Ng can really assume a position in top management and so help carry out the 
rollouts of the PCCW HKT's new products. But he alone can provide only scant 
support as he was assigned to head Pacific Convergence Corp. (PCC). That said, 
despite the fact that Richard Li assembled a group of lieutenants with diverse skills 
and backgrounds, they are unable to help much as "marshals", who share in strategic 
management, but instead can only accomplish their "division-commander" 
assignments. 
Facing the radical changes arising from the mega-merger, a leader with visions 
is far from satisfactory. So what kinds of leaders does PCCW-HKT need? The merged 
entity needs a transformational leader who can lead the changes. A transformational 
leader is a man who can create and communicate a strategic vision, model the vision 
and build commitment toward the vision. But Richard Li is not a transformational 
leader. His disposal of 1% of PCCW's stocks on 8 August 2000 and reinvestment in 
the company stock in November, is a piece of evidence illustrating his speculative 
motive which discredited his commitment toward the organization and its businesses. 




Wrong strategies are the root of the problem that makes this mega-merger fails 
to create values. The corporate strategy, business strategy and financing strategy 
adopted by PCCW are inappropriate which makes the company failed to capitalize on 
the valuable assets of HKT. 
1.) Corporate Strategy 
The motives of many related businesses mergers are to take advantage of the 
sharing of resources and transfer of competence. As far as PCCW is concern, the 
acquisition HKT is a related diversification strategy with the same motives. HKT's 
telecommunication infrastructure, huge customer base and distribution channels are 
crucial to the development of PCCW's core businesses. Apparently, this 
diversification is beneficial to PCCW. However, with PCCW—HKT fresh merged, 
PCCW's core businesses has not yet integrated into the incumbent HKT to develop a 
new set of core competences. In addition, its business model such as NOW remains 
unproven. In this circumstance, how can PCCW capitalize on HKT's broadband 
network, distribution channel to create values for the combined entity? How can the 
services offered by PCCW add values to HKT's customers? And what can HKT 
benefit from this merger? It appears that PCCW's management have not evaluated the 
pros and cons of the merger thoroughly. 
Apart from this, PCCW's strategy on the CyberWorks Venture (CWV) 
investments is problematic. The beginning strategy of CWV is to build up a portfolio 
of Internet-related companies and to capitalize on the strengths of this companies to 
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facilitate PCCW's development of NOW and e-commerce businesses. The global 
Internet boom has boosted market values of the CWV investments. PCCW's 
management began fall into bluefish feeding frenzy. Management started frenzied 
buying of dozens of dot corns with vulnerable business model. They were confident 
that these companies will be able to go for IPO soon or later and generate huge returns 
for the PCCW. With such speculative attitude, management ignored the importance of 
integrating these companies to create a distinctive competence. As a result, CWV 
investments remain a cluster of stuff that have no remarkable contribution to PCCW-
HKT's businesses. 
2.) Business Strategy 
The failure of NOW in Hong Kong is mainly due to its wrong market 
positioning. What NOW offering is TV entertainment and information service through 
the Internet. NOW seems put much emphasis on the entertainment element and 
downplay the Internet element. However, there are many strong substitutions such as 
cable TV for the TV entertainment in Hong Kong. Positioning itself as a provider of 
TV entertainment NOW does not have a competitive advantage over these substitutes. 
That is the reason why NOW failed to appeal to the audience when broadcasting on 
cable TV's channel during last year. 
Moreover, NOW's marketing strategy is also problematic. In Hong Kong, very 
few people have heard of NOW or know what it is. It is because it did not put much 
marketing efforts in the Hong Kong market such as TV or magazine advertising. 
However, NOW has spent lavishly on glitzy corporate parties in New York and 
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London to celebrate the launch of service. However, New York and London are not 
the markets NOW targets for. In this event, it indicated the misallocation of marketing 
resource. 
3.) Financing Strategy 
Besides deal makers and marketing people PCCW also has corporate finance 
experts such as Francis Yuen who helped the company to get HK$93,600 million cash 
within one month. But it does not mean PCCW has a good financing strategy. On 
contrary, PCCW has adopted a problematic financing strategy in this merger deal, 
which have brought detrimental effects to the combined organization. 
Using bank borrowings and equity exchange to finance merger deals is not 
uncommon in the world history of M&A. However, borrowing HK$93,600 millions 
cash, which is 8 times the net asset values of PCCW before merger, to finance the 
acquisition of HKT is a unwise financing strategy. If PCCW has the repayment 
capability, then it does not matter of how big the borrowing is. However, given its 
scanty income generating businesses and low cash reserve (HK$3,920 million as at 31 
December 1999), PCCW's repayment ability was disqualified. 
Moreover, the company's finance of loan repayment by selling off HK's 
profitable mobile business, using HKT's cash reserve, right issue of shares, issuing 
convertible bonds and revolving bank loans has revealed that management have no 
solution for the loan repayment. All these acts can only temporarily resolve the 
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repayment problem. But they also weaken the merged entity's financial strength and 
heighten its liabilities. 
(vi) Integration Of The Five Categories Of Assets 
In the above analysis of each category of assets the merged entity PCCW-HKT 
do have many valuable assets such as the broadband network, large customer base, 
effective distribution channel, huge cash reserve, CyberWorks Venture and expertise 
from Telstra. However, when these assets combine together, no significant value 
creation can be seen. So what went wrong? 
As mentioned at the beginning of Chapter IV the five categories of assets 
interact with each other and determine the overall values to be created. Organization 
assets, PCCW-HKT falls short of, are the core assets that determines whether other 
categories of assets can create values. PCCW's overly innovative ideas, the lack of a 
transformational leader, and a combination of inappropriate strategies have caused the 
merged entity failed to realize the potential values of those valuable assets. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that organization assets are the most important assets in this case. 




(I) Reposition NOW 
As NOW is lacking content suppliers and there are many substitutions for TV 
entertainment service in Hong Kong and, NOW has no competitive advantage on 
doing entertainment business. Therefore, PCCW-HKT should reposition its NOW 
business. Internet should be the area NOW should put more emphasis on. It is because 
Internet will increasingly be a popular media for people communication and business 
transaction. PCCW-HKT has the strength on Internet service. Backing up by HKT's 
broadband infrastructure NOW has the competitive advantage over the rivals for 
delivering Internet service in TV. NOW should form alliance with international 
Internet players such as American Online to offer appealing contents and take 
advantage of their hyperlink to provider a variety of services to customers. In this way, 
NOW can secure its competitive edge. On the other hand, it can save PCCW-HKT 
money as it can terminate the production of unprofitable entertainments. 
(II) Focus More On HKT's Corporate Clients 
Given the intense competition in the Hong Kong's telecommunication industry, 
HKT'S I D D and fixed line business have lost a competitive edge. Although, they are 
the cash generating business for HKT, they are not very profitable business and 
growth is very limited. Presently, the business area with growth potential is the 
provision of industry specific solutions to corporate clients. PCCW-HKT has a 
distinctive competence on this business. It is because HKT already has an established 
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customer base in this business. Besides, with the joint venture formed with Telstra, 
PCCW-HKT shares the technologies and infrastructure of Telstra to develop Internet 
data centre and IP backbone, which strengthen the quality of the services offered to 
corporate clients and meet their needs. By pursuing this business strategy, it will bring 
PCCW-HKT a promising source of cash income to ease the current tight liquidity 
situation. 
(Ill) Restructure The CyberWorks Venture (CWV) 
Presently, CWV is just a cluster of disparate and uncorrelated companies, 
which have no significant contributions to PCCW-HKT's core businesses. Besides, 
the substantial drop in the market values of CWV's investments has damaged the 
company's share price. Under this circumstance, PCCW-HKT should review its CWV 
investment portfolio and classify which companies can benefit PCCW-HKT's core 
businesses and which cannot. It should sell off the stakes in those companies that have 
no significant contribution to or unrelated to PCCW-HKT's core businesses. The best 
way is to exchange with other international corporations for some investments that 
will really add values to the merged entity. 
For the remaining companies PCCW-HKT must formulate a strategy to 
integrate and coordinate them to create values for the merged entity. For example, 
management should think about how those e-commerce companies in the CWV 
portfolio can fit into the NOW business or contribute to HKT's corporate client 
services. 
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(IV) Transform Core Businesses Into Joint Ventures 
Given PCCW-HKT's current weak financial position, it is difficult for the 
company to pursue its businesses in its own. Telecommunication business is still the 
major cash generating business of the merged entity. However, the company must 
constantly inject money into the infrastructure and R&D in order to maintain a 
competitive edge in the market. The formation of joint ventures with Telstra is to 
resolve this problem. In fact, the company should consider forming more joint 
ventures. It should consider forming alliance with Hutchison Whampoa, which has a 
very strong financial position and good connections with international telecom players. 
Through Hutchison, PCCW-HKT may be able to find some international corporations, 
having interest in Hong Kong's telecommunication market, to jointly develop 3G or 
WAP business, which requires huge investments. PCCW-HKT its experience and 
expertise in the Hong Kong telecommunication industry are distinctive competence 
seek by those international corporations. The formation of joint ventures can save 




CyberWork Venture Investment Portfolio 
Estimated Ownership 
Investment Stake % of Total 
Company Category US$ million % Portfolio 
Listed Investments 
CMGI Investment Fund 350 3% 47.2% 
Softnet Connectivity 129 18% 17.4% 
Hikari Tsushin Int'l Investment Fund 27 20% 3.7% 
StarEastNet.com Content 21 12% 2.9% 
Tom.com Content 17 4% 2.2% 
Pets.com Content 13 2% 1.8% 
MediaRing.com Infrastructure 10 2% 1.3% 
iMerchants.com E-commerce 6 7% 0.8% 
Sina.com E-commerce 5 2% 0.7% 
iBeam.com Infrastructure 5 3% 0.7% 
Spike Networks E-commerce 4 5% 0.5% 
Rediff.com Content 1 4% 0.1% 
Sohu.com E-commerce 5 5% 0.7% 
Divine Interventures E-commerce 1 2% 0.1% 
Estimated value of Listed Investments 594 80.1% 
Unlisted Investments 
Outblaze.com E-commerce 34 46% 4.6% 
Total Ecom E-commerce 30 50% 4.0% 
SilkRoute.com E-commerce 16 25% 2.3% 
Digiscent.com E-commerce 10 13% 1.3% 
Asia Java Fund Investment Fund 10 21% 1.3% 
Point Property Content 6 25% 0.8% 
Equinix E-commerce 5 5% 0.7% 
iLink.net Infrastructure 5 80% 0.7% 
Beatnik.com Content 3 1% 0.4% 
ActionAce.com Content 2 10% 0.3% 
ETNet.com.hk Content 2 2% 0.3% 
SinoMD.com Content 2 10% 0.3% 
Vicus Content 2 10% 0.3% 
3Fusion E-commerce 2 22% 0.3% 
Escrow.com E-commerce 2 2% 0.3% 
Magically E-commerce 2 12% 0.3% 
Orama Partners Investment Fund 2 5% 0.3% 
CreditLand.com Content 1 5% o.1% 
Taste for Living Content 1 2% 0.1% 
Ugo.com Content 1 5% 0.1% 
Dotcast.com E-commerce 1 6% 0.1% 
eLetter.com E-commerce 1 5% 0.1% 
Intelligenesis E-commerce 1 6% 0.1% 
TurboLinix E-commerce 1 1% 0.1% 
Weave Innovations E-commerce 1 3% 0.1% 
Moringstar Asia Content 1 35% 0.1% 
OfficePlease Content 2 7% 0.3% 
OICQ.com Infrastructure 1 20% o.1% 
iAsiaworks Infrastructure 1 5% o.1% 
Estimated value of Unlisted Investments 148 19.9% 
Estimated Porfolio Value 742 100.0% 
Source: "Man of the Year: Richard Li Tzar Kai." Hong Kong Business, January 2001, p. 24. 
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Appendix 2. 
Financing Arrangement for the Acquisition of HKT 
Equivalent to 
Event Nature US$ million HK$ million 
Drawn down a short term bridge loan facility on Aug. 00 Financing 12,000 93,600 
Paid by PCCW's plus HKT's cash reserves Repayment N/A (29,927) 
Paid by proceeds from issue of convertible bonds Repayment (1,100) (8,580) 
Paid by proceeds from the right Issue of shares Repayment N/A (4,143) 
Paid by proceeds from selling stake in HKT's mobile business Repayment (1,680) (13,100) 
Paid by proceeds from placing convertible bond to Telstra Repayment (750) (5,850) 
Outstanding loan balance as at 31 Dec. 00 4’ 100 32,000 
Drawn down a long term syndication loan on Feb. 01 Refinancing 4,700 36,660 
Source: "PCCW Final Results Announcement For The Year Ended December 31, 2000." South China 
Morning Post, March 28, 2001, p. 11. 
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Appendix 3. 
The Management Team of PCCW 
Name Title Work Experience  
Richard Li Chairman Founder of Star TV 
Francis Yuen Deputy Chairman Investment banking 
Peter To Deputy Chairman Property development and investment 
Alex Arena Managing Director Telecommunication regulating 
Peter Allen Chief Financial Officer Qualified Accountant 
Mico Chung Executive Director Corporate Finance 
Nicholas Golfer Executive Director Property development 
Todd Bonner Executive Director Investment banking 
George Chan Executive Director TV broadcasting 
Herbert Ng Chief Executive Officer Telecommunication management 
Steve Moss Chief Operating Officer TV broadcasting 
Jonathan Latter Project Director of Cyberport Civil engineering 
W.Michael Verge Treasurer Qualified Accountant 
Michael Johnson Senior Advisor to Chairman TV director and producer 
Lawrence Lam Chief Executive Officer Property investment and management 
Dr. Liang T. Wu Executive Vice President Telecommunication research and development 
Augustine Chui Senior Advisor to the company Civil servant on TV licencing 
Winnie Siu Morrison Executive Vice President Legal peactioner 
John Colmey Head of Research Journalist 
Rebecca Leung Executive Vice President Journalist 
Helen Chu Company Secretary Company secretarial 
John Menster Senior Vice President human resources management 
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